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Abstract 
Translatability of a work of art, according to Walter Benjamin, is an essential ability to allow a 
translation to take on »a specific significance inherent in the original« so that it will retain a 
close relationship to the original. In contrast, Gerhard Richter's photo-based paintings show 
such an auratic significance of the original in its innate deficiency or intranslatability. As 
Rosemary Hawker puts it, the striking effect of blur in his paintings represents itself at once 
as a unique photographic idiom and a distinctive shortcoming of photography which impedes 
the medium from providing viewers with clearly perceivable images; the blur creates a site of 
différance in which both media come to a common understanding of one another’s idioms by 
telling what those idioms always fail to achieve. In this short essay, I will examine ways in 
which Richter’s photographic and pictorial works, including early monochrome paintings and 
recent abstract works based on microscopic photographs of molecular structures, attempt to 
untranslate photographic idioms in order to see painting’s (in)abilities simultaneously. In 
doing so, I intend to observe in the artist’s pictorial practice an actual phenomenon that the 
image can designate certain facts or truths only through its inherent plurality, faultiness, and 
partiality.  
Introduction 
<1> 
For postwar artists, if not all, it was a compulsion to withdraw their artworks from the 
conventions of art making. Without taking examples of Pop Art’s coexistence with the social 
reality of mass media and happenings by Fluxus, ›negation‹ as a mode of production has 
been given a specific moral quality the artists can follow to free something from conventional 
artistic practices. There has been a legitimated assumption that the historical convention of 
art is not on which one’s work is based but an obstacle that it has to overcome. This negative 
mind-set, however, does not appear as a mere derivative of Dadaistic tradition in Richter’s 
photo-paintings, though it provides a basis for his critical attitude toward picture making. 
Indeed, it is not only the denunciation of the past, but also the negation of the ideological 
belief that proclaims the demise of painting, in that Richter has simultaneously criticized and 
continued to engage in a habitual pictorial practice by painting photographs. Unlike those 
who have embarked on subversive projects to renounce the genealogical association with 
modernist discourses, Richter has insisted on the sincerity of his commitment to the medium 
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of painting whose social, historical, and symbolic qualities have been challenged under the 
discursive name of the avant-garde. Nonetheless the intimacy with painting indicates less a 
galvanization of the obsolete legitimacy of the medium than an ironic acknowledgment of the 
so-called productive disablement of picture making with the reflexive aids of photography. He 
has sought not to paint but to produce ›something‹ that would be definitive rather than 
authentic: something that would be neither what painting nor photography can represent; and 
something that would only be engendered through the radical negotiation of each medium’s 
inherent characteristic, shortcoming, or idiom. 
The Idiom 
<2> 
In accounting for what is idiomatic to each medium, it is worth referring to the discussion on 
the nature of the idiom in Jacques Derrida’s »Passe-partout«, the preface to his book The 
Truth in Painting. For Derrida, the idiom does not mean mere locutions in a language. It is 
what makes each medium unique. He found that a statement, ›I am interested in the idiom in 
painting‹, would infinitely diverge and thus could never be reduced to a single definition. 
When one says ›I am interested in the idiom in painting‹, according to Derrida, she might be 
interested in 1) the painted idiom in painting, 2) the idiom ›in painting‹, 3) »the idiomatic trait 
or style (that which is singular, proper inimitable) in the domain of painting«,1 or 4) the 
specificity of pictorial art as if it were that of language. Derrida said: »but each one divides 
again, and is grafted and contaminated by all the others, and you would never be finished 
translating them.«2 Here Derrida indicated the essential plurality of the idiom, namely the 
idiom within the idiom. While there is an idiom in the statement that allows no one to match 
each of four referents with what the statement truly means, one can infinitely ›generate‹ 
remainders by contemplating what the statement can tell her. Although all the remainders 
amount to the memory that one has failed to describe the idiom in the statement, each can 
be a fragment of some other truth. Every attempt to detect ›what is idiomatic‹ incompletely 
but certainly delineates the truth in an object, and points out something other than that truth, 
the truth in a different object, or another truth in the original object. If there is any reason that 
Richter insists on the intranslatability of the idiom when he paints a photograph, it seems to 
be this generative principle of incessantly pondering what is idiomatic to photography: a 
chance to cause ›something‹ different from the photograph he used by displacing the 
meaning of the remainder. Richter says: »I’m not trying to imitate a photograph; I’m trying to 
make one.«3 
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<3> 
Let us think about what kind of photographic idioms Richter has applied to his paintings. 
Richter begins by choosing a photograph that fascinates him, that he wants to paint. He then 
deliberately transforms the photograph into a painting and adds distinctive visual turmoil to 
the picture surface. This enables the viewer to see the finished work as neither a masterly 
painted photograph nor as a photographically realistic painting. In this dialectical 
manipulation of two media, the effect of a blur is significant. The blur opens up a path 
through which one can come close to the specificity of photographic representation. In the 
early history of photography it was an appealing photographic trope that could echo »the 
excitement of the modern age« epitomized by Futurist experiments with the depiction of 
speed and movement.4 But at the same time the blur signifies the technical naivety of 
photography. The medium ends up with a lack of visual clarity whenever it captures moving 
objects »because the camera does not apprehend objects: it sees them«.5 It is this 
paradoxical nature of the blur in which Richter touches upon some truth in either 
photography or painting. 
 
1  Gerhard Richter: Two Fiats, 1964, oil on canvas, 130 x 200 cm,  
Baden-Baden, Museum Sammlung Frieder Burda 
<4> 
Rosemary Hawker finds this truth as »a clear index of the different temporality that shapes 
the media of photography and painting«.6 In Hawker’s view, Richter’s Two Fiats (fig. 1) 
becomes a key for understanding what is idiomatic to each medium’s perception and 
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representation of time. Photography always attests to the barest form of consecutive time at 
the expense of interpretation, whereas painting takes its time negotiating with the concept of 
temporality by painting it. Two Fiats tries to refer not only to the idiom in photography but to 
that in painting by simultaneously acknowledging and criticizing the former. In the very same 
way, at this site of collision of the idioms, the painting demonstrates the shared inadequacy 
of the media’s ability to depict what one calls ›reality‹. Hawker writes: »This image is about 
the capacities and limitations of the medium it is rendered in, painting, and also the medium 
to which it overtly refers, photography. It is so much about the limits of representation, in 
either media, that without the title it would be difficult to ascertain what is shown here.«7 
Hawker suggests that the intranslatability of photographic idiom can be ascribable to the 
idiom in the medium that tries to translate it: that thinking about the idiom in photography 
becomes synonymous with thinking about the idiom, or the truth, in painting and vice versa. 
Two Fiats can then be said to detect more benefits from contemplating what the media 
›cannot‹ than what they ›can‹, that is, from visualizing what is idiomatic to each medium than 
being disappointed at the loss of the visually informative. 
Magnifying Vision 
<5> 
While the blur occupies an important place in Richter’s art, there is another striking example 
of the photographic idiom which he has long explored. 128 Details from a Picture of 1978 is 
the earliest work in which the artist utilized ›magnifying vision‹ that is idiomatic to 
photography. Unlike the case of Two Fiats, ›painting from photography‹, Richter 
photographed the surface of an abstract oil sketch that had been exhibited at the Anna and 
Leonowen’s Gallery of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design. The 128 photographs of 
the surface had been taken »from various sides, from various angles, various distances and 
under different light conditions« and were mounted in groups of sixteen pictures on eight 
individually framed panels, presented in two rows.8 In 1998, the artist made offset prints from 
the panels, which can be shown either lined up or presented as a two- or four-row block. To 
date, he has made two artist’s books and one photo edition featuring the motifs of the 128 
photographs. 
<6> 
›Photography from painting‹ is one of the recurrent themes in Richter’s art, which often 
appears in the proactive reintroduction of his own paintings in the form of photo editions such 
as Loo Paper (painting 1965; photo edition 1994), Uncle Rudi (1965; 2000), Ema (1966; 
1992), 48 Portraits (1971-72; 1998), Cathedral Corner (1987; 1998), Betty (1988; 1991), 
Small Bather (1994; 1996), and Ravine (1996; 1997). On the face of things, 128 Details 
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seems to be a step in this direction. However, the contrast between the work’s sham 
proximity to and telling distance from the original painting distinguishes it from these editions. 
The work concerns not so much the reference to the painting to which it is supposed to refer 
but the difference from its supposed referent. In essence, the magnifying vision of 
photography is the way to unteach us that a part is fragment, and that the sum of parts 
becomes a certain integral. For each photograph depicts the incomplete surface just as the 
collective of the 128 fragments never reconstructs the original wholeness. Even if the viewer 
had already seen the photographed painting, she can hardly retrieve from the scattered 
scenery what it once revealed to her. Moreover, since the actual size of the painting is even 
smaller than that of each panel constituting 128 Details, all efforts to re-cover the cortical 
layer of the painting with grossly-enlarged photographic cutis would be in vain. Each 
photographed fragment is thus deprived of its marked fragmentality. Or, it is no longer able to 
avoid exposing its ever-increasing entirety that never allows us to recognize it as a part of 
something. This entirety would never be given by any pictorial practices. It is not a predicted 
outcome, but a residuary visual experience caused by failing to find any veritable fragments 
from the recorded details even through the penetrating gaze of a camera. 
<7> 
Note that the magnifying vision does not intend to stress the rupture between the signified 
and the signifier. Rather, it concentrates on the manifold aspects of ceasing to be a mere 
surface by insisting on each photograph’s autonomous spatiality. Some of the 128 pictures 
succeed in illustrating this situation by articulating the essential ambiguity of the generic word 
›surface‹ through the intensified heterogeneity and inability to identify the painting as a 
whole. Here we have two achromatic illustrations in tandem from the artist book of 1980 (fig. 
2), each taken from a horizontal perspective with an enhanced contrast in lighting, dimly 
obscuring the picture plane from which they originate.  
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2  Gerhard Richter: Two illustrations from the artist book  
128 Details from a Picture (Halifax 1978),  
Halifax: The Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1980  
These illustrations redefine the texture of the painterly surface as that of firm ground on 
which we can step and walk. The lively brushstrokes all over the surface become the 
analogue of ›urban skin‹ as if we were looking at the cold asphalt that is shiny with the street 
lights glistening off the rain. While the original brushwork used to ›enshroud‹ the surface of 
what is supposed to be hung in a wall in the exhibition space, the new textured surface 
enables the viewer to anticipate the emerging field in which various movements, activities, 
operations, and narratives would take place. In this sense, the concept of the picture plane 
no longer proclaims confrontational verticality but alludes to immersive receptivity that draws 
the viewer into the alternative dimension of the flatness. Although this view can remind us of 
what Leo Steinberg once described as »opaque flatbed horizontals«,9 Richter encounters the 
altered pigmented surface through none other than the magnifying vision of photography. 
Just as the entirety of what was once a fragment appears, it unfolds onto the surface the 
distinctive spatial reality that would never be accomplished by means of painting. 
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3  Gerhard Richter: Silicate, 2003, oil on canvas, 290 x 290 cm,  
Düsseldorf, K20 Kunstsammlung 
<8> 
After more than two decades of observing these complex dialogues between the part and the 
whole, the surface and the space, Richter was endowed with an ever intriguing motif that 
would make him realize another truth in the magnifying vision. In 2003, he worked on a 
series of four large photo-paintings titled Silicate (fig. 3) based on microscopic photographs 
of molecular structures in silicate minerals. The structures »are painted in, as mechanically 
as possible, and further painted over until all the brushstrokes have been painted away, and 
everything becomes as blurred as the microscopic photo and similarly mysterious looking«.10 
A year later, he worked with the printer Mike Karstens to make the gigantic digital print 
Strontium (fig. 4) for the new building of the de Young Museum in San Francisco designed by 
Herzog and de Meuron. The print, consisting of 130 parts and nearly ten by ten meters large, 
depicts an orderly arrangement of two different-sized spherical atoms in strontium titanate. 
The artist’s exploration of the motif of the atomic structure also brought some editions, such 
as 30.12.04, 31.12.04, and Graphite: each presentation of the interior of matter is covered 
with grey oil paint applied with a squeegee. 
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4  Gerhard Richter: Strontium, 2004, C-print, 910 x 945 cm,  
San Francisco, de Young 
<9> 
To be sure, all the images on which these works are based would have never been possible 
without the new scanning electron microscope. For Richter, technology has been the most 
cogent means to reflect on the problems of meaning and potency of painting in a postmodern 
era. But at the same time, any seemingly scientific approaches toward his picture making 
have never been able to show its taken-for-granted objectivity that painting has never 
achieved. While the artist has cuddled up to photography’s relatively simple and honest look 
at the phenomenal world in order to cancel out all the axiomatic pictorial elements, he has 
kept using the medium to expose its intrinsic flaws in representation. Thus, although the 
atomic structure constitutes the foundational part of every substance on Earth, its 
exaggerated and obscured manifestation is destined to attest to the absence of a referent. 
None of the works with atom motifs will reveal to the viewer anything about what they 
represent except the mechanical repetition of molecular chains in an unassertive manner. 
The deeper the viewer looks into the inside of a substance, the more obscure the cell-like 
image signifies to her. As Richter remarked in the interview with Benjamin H. D. Buchloh in 
2004, at first there was no choice but to call the paintings of silicate Strukturen because, in 
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his words, »I don’t even know what kind of substance the [original] illustration is supposed to 
depict.«11 In this sense, every idiomatic expression that identifies the inmost center of an 
object with the domicile of the truth would be forced to divest itself of its immediate 
significance. Therefore, what we can learn from seeking the truth in the expressions that 
point out the location of the truth, is that each speculation about what is idiomatic to the 
expressions diversifies and multiplies what they can mean to us, which is exemplified by the 
blurry visualization of the uniform, repetitive atomic structure. 
Conclusion  
<10> 
It is worthy of note that all of Richter’s works that we have examined here correspond to 
Derrida’s argument about the idiomatic implications of the structural in the tradition of post-
Kantian Western philosophy. While Derrida aimed to strip the structure of the structural that 
framed and regulated the regime of art so that he could anticipate any possible displacement 
of the meaning of the structural, Richter’s works can be said to simulate Derrida’s 
deconstructive scheme to produce the alternative that is able to shed light on some truths in 
representational media. Richter’s radical reflections on the tensions between the part and the 
whole, the surface and the space, the inside and the outside illuminate how these conflicts 
are discursive and contingent. Indeed, to look for what is idiomatic to photography from the 
perspective of painting is by no means to revalidate either medium’s established advantages, 
but to notice the fundamental unproductiveness to differentiate the undifferentiable. For 
Richter has tried to encounter something that we have always failed to recognize – not to 
translate, interpret, or represent what we already know. 
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